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across countries induce di¤erent mappings from election outcomes to distributions of power.
We explore how these di¤erent mappings a¤ect votersparticipation in a democracy. Assum-
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similar support, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all system than in a power sharing system;
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1. Introduction
Voter participation is an essential component of democracy, and changes in the level of
electoral participation may a¤ect the political positioning of the competing parties, electoral
outcomes and ultimately public policy. At the same time, the level of electoral participation,
electoral outcomes, political parties and other aspects of the political landscape are all endogen-
ous and widely believed to be consequences of the electoral rules. A key property of electoral
systems is the degree of proportionality in translating votes to seats, and an important lit-
erature has developed in comparative politics that studies the empirical relationship between
proportionality on voter turnout.1 Many conjectures have been o¤ered about whether or not
more proportional systems lead to higher turnout and why. Heuristic arguments have been
o¤ered on both sides. Many empirical studies have looked at the relationship, with mixed
results. While the overall picture is not as blurry as it was twenty ve years ago, it is still out
of focus.
This article develops a formal approach in order to provide some essential foundations for
the study of the complex relationship between proportionality and turnout. Our approach is
two-pronged. First, we provide a theoretical analysis of the fundamental causes of the variation
in turnout based on di¤erences in institutions for political power sharing, or proportionality.
This lls an important gap, as the rigorous theoretical examination of the various conjectures
and heuristic arguments is at present virtually nonexistent. Given the prominence of these
questions in the comparative politics eld, this is an important gap to ll. Second, we report
results from a laboratory experiment designed to test the key hypotheses that emerge from
the theory about the relationship between turnout and proportionality. The results of the
experiment starkly show how the theoretical forces in the model play out largely as predicted
in the laboratory elections. The experiment, while obviously a stylized version of elections in the
eld, enjoys the equally obvious advantage of avoiding confounding factors that have challenged
empirical studies. These include the measurement of competitiveness, properly controlling for
1The comparison is usually stated in terms of di¤erences between SMP (single-member plurality) systems
and PR (proportional representation). However, there are di¤erent incarnations of PR that imply varying
degrees of proportionality in the translation of votes to seats, as well as di¤erent constitutional arrangements
at the legislative and executive levels that lead to variations in how seats translate into political power. The
approach in this paper is to consider both parts of the equation, and hence we use the terms "power sharing"
and "proportionality" interchangeably.
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social/cultural factors, endogeneity of the choice of electoral system2, isolating the e¤ects of
district magnitude or multimember districts, and taking into account institutional variations
in government formation, to name a few.
Because of these possible confounding factors, it is useful to reconsider the existing empirical
evidence about the relationship between proportionality and turnout in light of them. The main
claim in this literature is that proportionality increases turnout, and, in particular, PR systems
will produce more turnout than SMP systems. We propose that this prominent piece of political
science folklore deserves closer scrutiny for at least two reasons.
First, there have been statements suggesting that this claim is implied by theoretical results.
For example, the lead sentence of the abstract in Bowler et al. (2001) reads "Theory suggests
that majoritarian/plurality elections depress voter participation and that proportional election
systems encourage greater voter mobilization and turnout." This could easily be misinterpreted
to suggest that there is actually a body of formal theory identifying su¢ cient conditions that
apply to a broad array of elections. This is not the case; the "theory" referred to consists of
informal arguments based on casual theorizing.3 This could also be misinterpreted as suggesting
that there arent informal arguments that would imply the opposite conclusion, that SMP
systems might produce higher turnout than PR systems. One of the pioneering papers on
the subject, Powell (1980), argues that for several reasons SMP systems are more transparent
than PR systems, which may boost turnout. Some possible factors have been argued both
ways. For example, it was initially argued (e.g., Gosnell 1930), based on the mobilization story,
that PR may produce higher turnout because it leads to more political parties, with party
platforms closely aligned with or even specially tailored to specic groups of voters. However,
2As pointed out by Boix (2000), at the point of universal su¤rage and the requisite political ascendancy of
socialist parties in Europe, the choice of PR versus majoritarian systems depended on the relationship between
the existing parties. If socialist parties were weak, then the majoritarian system would be retained (majoritarian
systems were more of a norm before universal su¤rage). If the two existing parties, the one in power and the
challenger, had votes split down the middle, then the elites could benet more from switching to a PR system
as not to risk too much power in the hand of socialist parties. If one party was dominant, then the retention
of a majoritarian system was more likely. Thus, turnout in majority systems could be lower also because these
cases were less competitive at the time of the concession of universal su¤rage.
3An exception is the mobilization model that is sketched out in Cox (1999), but the result requires a strong
assumption that would be di¢ cult to verify empirically. He notes in passing that "..there is no fully developed
model of the sort sketched in the text to be consulted in the literature..." (p. 415).
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after repeated ndings of a negative e¤ect of the number of parties on turnout (see, for example,
Jackman and Miller 1995), new arguments surfaced to explain the opposite e¤ect.4
Second, there are claims that the evidence is overwhelming to the point that it is accepted
almost as a law in political science. Selb (2009), leads o¤ his introduction with "There is wide
agreement among scholars that the proportionality of electoral systems...is positively associ-
ated with voter participation." Some empirical evidence on turnout in national elections (see
e.g. Powell (1980, 1986), Crewe (1981), Jackman (1987) and Jackman and Miller (1995), Blais
and Carthy (1990) and Franklin (1996)) leads to the conclusion (also endorsed for example in
Lijphart 1997 and 2000) that, everything else being equal, turnout is lower in plurality and ma-
jority elections than under Proportional Representation. However, beside the caveat that these
results are based on a sample of very small size, if one digs a little deeper, one nds that the res-
ults are rather mixed. For example, there are some glaring exceptions that are dismissed with
idiosyncratic explanations, and without such exclusion the comparative results would disap-
pear.5 Acemoglu (2005) argues that cultural and idiosyncratic characteristics that are di¢ cult
to control for make it di¢ cult to assess the causal e¤ects of institutional di¤erences, since insti-
tutions are themselves endogenous.6 Blais (2006) in his turnout survey concludes that many
of the ndings in the comparative cross-national research are not robust, and when they are,
we do not have a compelling microfoundation account of the relationship.Black (1991) nds
no signicant relationship between electoral systems and turnout in his cross-national study.
Research dealing with Latin America reports no association (Perez-Linan (2001), Fornos et al.
(2004)), and an analysis that incorporates both established and non-established democracies
concludes that the electoral system has a weak e¤ect (Blais and Dobrzynska (1998)).7
Where does this leave us? The empirical ndings are mixed and the theory is mostly
nonexistent or based on post hoc rationalization. Is it possible to formally theorize about the
impact of proportionality on turnout and characterize the relationship in a robust way? Does
the theory imply a monotone relationship between proportionality and turnout or is it more
4Yet another study nds an ambiguous relationship between turnout and the number of parties (Capron and
Kruseman 1988).
5Switzerland is the most prominent exception of a PR system with low turnout. New Zealand (prior to
switching to PR) is an exception in the opposite direction. Blais (2000 & 2006) points out how his result in
Blais and Carthy (1990) relies entirely on the treatment of New Zealand as a deviant case.
6Putnam et al. (1983) make a similar point, as does Boix (2000). See footnote 2.
7See Blais & Aarts (2005) for a more detailed review of these studies.
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complicated than that, depending on other factors? Can those other factors be identied and
do they have any predictive value?
In order to develop a theory as robust and general as possible, our rst decision is to
consider all possible determinants of the degree of proportionality in a reduced form, considering
as equally important all the di¤erent institutional systems impacting the mapping from vote
shares to the relative weight of di¤erent parties in policy making (henceforth power shares).8
We introduce a power sharing, or proportionality, parameter, , that allows us to embed a wide
array of electoral systems ranging from a fully proportional power sharing system ( = 1) to
a pure winner-take-all system ( = 1). Hence we try to assess in a general way the role of
these institutions on electoral participation by characterizing how that vote-shares-to-power-
shares mapping a¤ects voters incentives to vote and partiescampaign e¤orts. Second, and
perhaps most importantly, in order for our theory to be robust we allow for multiple alternative
behavioral assumptions about the turnout mechanics, rather than limiting our analysis to one
single approach such as rational instrumental voting or mobilization.
The theoretical results we obtain from all models, from instrumental voting to mobilization
models, depend on a key variable, namely the expected winning margin or closenessof the
election.9 While there is some empirical evidence about the relationship between ex ante close-
ness and turnout (Blais 2000, Cox and Munger 1989), we are not aware of any empirical work
focusing on the interaction e¤ect of expected closeness and the degree of power sharing of the
institutional system: most empirical work comparing turnout in di¤erent electoral systems does
not seem to control for election closeness. As we try to prove in this paper election closeness
is a key variable which should not be overlooked. While closeness has been conjectured to play
an important role, at least in SMP elections, little is understood about the e¤ect of closeness
8The relative power of the majority party for a given election outcome varies with the degree of separation
of powers, the organization of chambers, the assignment of committee chairmanships and institutional rules on
agenda setting, allocation of veto powers, and obviously electoral rules. See Lijphart (1999) and Powell (2000)
for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of political institutions on what they call degree of proportionality
of inuence, which is basically our vote-shares to power-shares mapping. Electoral rules determine the mapping
from vote shares to seat shares in a legislature, whereas the other institutions determine the subsequent mapping
from seat shares to power shares across parties.
9Cox (1999), as summary of the analysis of the elite mobilization section, says that "...the argument following
Key (1949) says that closeness will (a) boost mobilizational e¤ort and (b) correlate positively with turnout."
Our model will qualify these statements for each degree of proportionality and hence comparatively, and will
do so not only for the mobilization logic but also from the instrumental voting perspective.
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in proportional or partially proportional systems. We are able to identify theoretically how
proportionality and turnout interact with the closeness variable, and nd that these interaction
e¤ects are quite subtle. Before explaining how the vote-share to power-share mapping and the
expected closeness of an election jointly determine turnout, we rst highlight the basic modeling
approach taken in the paper.
In all models, turnout is costly, be it individual voting costs or mobilization costs. We take
as the baseline model in our analysis the standard rational voter model (see e.g. Ledyard (1984)
and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)) under population uncertainty10, extending the analysis to
the proportional inuence or proportional power sharing system. We also analyze the same
comparative questions using other prominent approaches from the turnout theory literature:
mobilization and ethical voting,11 both of which share with the baseline model not only the
fact that each voter has a cost of voting, but also the fact that each voter has a preference
for one of the alternatives (candidates or parties or coalitions of parties), so that the only
relevant decision by each citizen is whether or not to vote.12 The robustness of the theoretical
comparative ndings is then put to a test in a large study of 1900 laboratory elections, where
we experimentally control and manipulate the proportionality parameter, voting costs and the
competitiveness of the election.
The key to understanding the interaction between proportionality, turnout, and closeness
is what we refer to as the underdog compensation e¤ect. Underdog compensation refers to
the phenomenon whereby smaller parties turnout in higher proportions than larger parties.
This is due in large part to the greater free rider problem that must be overcome in large
10Viewing the size of the electorate as a random variable (see Myerson 1998 and 2000) has the advantage of
simplifying the computations without altering the incentives driving the results. Krishna and Morgan (2011)
recently obtained important results in a model similar to ours, but with common values, in which population
uncertainty is key. In our setting population uncertainty serves only the purpose of allowing us to obtain
analytical results, but numerical computations we performed with xed population sizes conrm that all our
comparative results do not depend on population uncertainty.
11See Morton (1987, 1991), Cox and Munger (1989), Uhlaner (1989), and Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999) for
the mobilization approach). See Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) for the ethical
voting approach.
12Even though elite mobilization models and pivotal voting models put di¤erent emphasis on the voter
(passive versus active, etc.), closeness a¤ects turnout both at the level of masses and at that of elites. What we
nd is that these e¤ects are di¤erentiated in the same way across electoral rules, so that masses and elites can
be thought of as reacting very similarly to electoral rule reforms.
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parties.13 The robust theoretical result within the large class of models that we consider is that
any model of large elections featuring either a partial or zero underdog compensation e¤ect
yields the prediction that a winner take all system induces higher turnout in competitive races.
Proportional systems induce higher turnout than winner take all systems in less competitive
races. Thus, there is a crossing point. So the answer to the big question of whether PR
or SMP produces higher turnout is complicated: it can go either way, and depends on the
ex ante competitiveness of the election. The intuition is that in the winner-take-all system
when preferences are not evenly split the non full underdog compensation preserves the ex-ante
leading party as the ex-post leading party in equilibrium, hence preserving a high expected
winning margin, which discourages participation. In a more proportional power sharing system,
a less competitive election (i.e. a higher expected winning margin) does not a¤ect the incentives
to vote as much.
It is therefore crucial to explain the important role of the partial underdog compensation
e¤ect mentioned above, because without such a common feature, the instrumental rational
voting model could not possibly yield comparative predictions in line with the mobilization and
ethical voting models. Several recent theoretical papers14 have identied and used a neutrality
result for equilibrium turnout models of winner-take-all elections, which we call the full underdog
compensation e¤ect : The theoretical claim is that in pivotal voting models the expected vote
shares of the two parties are equal independent of the distribution of partisan preferences in
the population. Our paper shows that this result is not robust. Rather, it is a fragile nding,
based on special and empirically suspect technical assumptions about the distribution of costs
in those models. The property of full underdog compensation identied in earlier papers is
due to either an assumption that the distribution of voting costs is degenerate (Goeree and
Grosser 2007, Taylor and Yildirim 2010), or is bounded below by a strictly positive minimum
voting cost (Krasa and Polborn 2009), or is identical for voters from di¤erent parties.15 It is, in
fact, not a general property of pivotal voting models: if the two parties have supporters with
heterogeneous costs of voting with a distribution of voting costs with lower bound of support
13The underdog compensation phenomenon has an important implication for empirical research. It implies
that using margin of victory (or any other ex post measure of closeness) as a measure of ex ante competitiveness
of an election will produce a biased measure of that critical variable.
14See Goeree and Grosser (2007), Taylor and Yildirim (2010), Krasa and Polborn (2009).
15In contrast, the original Palfrey-Rosenthal (1985) model rules out the rst two of these special cases, and
explicitly allows for di¤erent distributions of voting costs for the two parties. Taylor and Yildirim (2010b) show
that the neutrality result generally fails if the lower bound of two partiesvoting costs is di¤erent.
7
less than or equal to zero, then the underdog compensation e¤ect is always partial or zero. The
intuition for this is easy to see in the extreme case where some fraction of voters have zero or
negative voting costs. In this case, for large elections they are the only ones who vote, and
there is no free rider problem among these voters because they get direct utility (or zero cost)
from voting. Hence there is zero underdog compensation in large elections. In the intermediate
case that occurs in our model, the underdog party supporters turn out in higher percentages
than the supporters of the favorite to win. Hence, the party with higher ex-ante support is
always expected to win, but by a smaller margin of victory than the ex-ante support advantage
(e.g. the opinion polls) would predict, which we refer to as partial underdog compensation.
Especially in rational instrumental models of voting without any assumed coordination
among voters, comparing turnout across systems boils down to comparing the individual be-
nets of voting across systems. In a proportional power sharing system the expected marginal
benet of a single vote is proportional to the marginal change in the vote share determined by
that vote. Whereas in a winner take all system the marginal benet of a vote is proportional
to the probability of that vote being pivotal. Both marginal benets obviously decrease as
the number of voters increases. In large elections the comparison of turnout across systems
hence depends on the asymptotic speed with which a larger population reduces the individual
benet of voting, i.e. the magnitude of the size e¤ect.16 Quantitatively we show that in a
proportional system the benet of voting decreases asymptotically as 1=N when N , the ex-
pected size of the electorate, increases; whereas in a winner-take-all system such asymptotic
speed is slower when the election is expected to be a tie and much faster otherwise. This fact
determines the main conclusion, namely that turnout is higher in a proportional system when
the election has a clear favorite party while a winner-take-all system induces higher turnout
otherwise. We conduct the bulk of the analysis for the case of two parties, but show in the
appendix the robustness of results to changes in the number of parties: in a proportional power
sharing system the order of magnitude of the size e¤ect does not depend on the distribution of
ex ante support of parties, nor does it depend on the number of parties present in the election.
We also show that in a proportional power sharing system turnout increases as the number of
parties increases.17
16As in Levine and Palfrey (2007) the size e¤ectrefers the the equilibrium e¤ect of overall turnout decreasing
with the size of the electorate.
17We conduct the bulk of the analysis for the case of two parties, but show in the appendix the robustness
of all comparisons to changes in the number of parties: in a proportional power sharing system the order of
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In sum, consider the three magnitudes, turnout in a close majority election, in a non-close
majority election and in a proportional election: we show that the rst magnitude is larger
than the second, which is expected and intuitive;18 but, more important, we also show that the
third magnitude lies exactly between the rst two. The latter is a novel quantitative result:
ex-ante, without an explicit model and computation, it was not at all clear what to expect.
This result is robust across all the costly voting models that we consider.
As we show in the extensions section, the qualitative results we obtain are also robust
to various power sharing regimes. We use the contest success function(see Tullock (1980))
to span all power sharing regimes. This is a methodological innovation. This function is
extensively used in several economic contexts, especially in the contest literature (see among
many others Skaperdas (2006)) typically as a mapping from e¤orts or resources to the chance
of victory.
Our approach is related more broadly to a body of literature that applies the Poisson
game approach to model strategic voting in large elections, see for instance Bouton (2012),
Bouton and Gratton (2013), Krishna and Morgan (2011), McMurray (2012), just to name
recent contributions. Castanheira (2003), in particular examines turnout in large winner take
all elections in the context of one-dimensional spatial competition between two candidates. He
obtains results by making the voters a continuum, i.e. swapping the incremental benet of a
vote with a derivative. He also partially extends his main results about the rate of convergence
to zero turnout in winner-take-all elections to the case where there can be a "mandate e¤ect",
which he models with a linearized weighting function, similar to Stigler (1972). Kartal (2013)
does not use a Poisson game approach, but also addresses the di¤erences in turnout in large
elections between the two extreme cases of proportional representation and winner-take-all
elections. She does not consider intermediate cases of power sharing, or non-instrumental
turnout models. The approach in that paper, similar to Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), is to
assume there is no uncertainty about either the number of voters in the election nor the number
magnitude of the size e¤ect does not depend on the distribution of ex ante support of parties, nor does it depend
on the number of parties present in the election. We also show that in a proportional power sharing system
turnout increases as the number of parties increases.
18For the relationship between closeness and turnout in a majoritarian election one could go back to Downs
(1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). Their premise is that citizens will participate in elections if and only if
the expected benets of voting exceed the costs, implying that closeness and turnout will be positively correlated
because higher closeness implies higher instrumental value of voting.
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of voters supporting each candidate. The theoretical analysis also has a di¤erent focus, aiming
to compare the welfare properties of the two systems.
If one moves away from the convenient population uncertainty world (convenient in terms of
tractability) it is straightforward to derive exact equilibrium conditions to be used for numerical
computation of the predictions for any known number of voters. Hence it is possible to test
the comparative results in the laboratory. Since Levine and Palfrey (2007) already provide a
preliminary set of data with winner-take-all rules, we adopted the same treatments even in the
new proportional experiments, so that the data could be pooled together. The experimental
results conrm the theoretical predictions of the general model, as well as other predictions on
the closeness e¤ects that came out specically from the known-population model computations.
Experimental evidence (see Schram and Sonnemans (1996)) suggests turnout is higher in a
majoritarian system than in proportional representation, but the experimental design featured
only the case of perfect symmetry in the ex-ante supports for the two parties. They nd higher
turnout in the winner take all elections than in PR, which is consistent with our theoretical
results. However, the theory also predicts that the turnout ordering will be reversed if the
partiesex-ante supports are su¢ ciently asymmetric. Related experimental ndings can also
be found in Kartal (2011), a laboratory study similar to ours that was developed independently.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the complete analysis of a rational
voter model of turnout, comparing the properties of proportional power sharing system and
winner-take-all system. Section 3 contains a number of important extensions and robustness
results, including the very important study of our comparative question using mobilization
and ethical voting models, clustered together as group-based models. Section 4 contains the
experimental analysis, where one can see that the rational costly voting model actually performs
very well in terms of comparative statics in small elections, and where one can see the general
ndings of the theory further conrmed. Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks and describes
potential paths of future research. All proofs of the model and of all its extensions are in the
Appendix, as well as a sample of the instructions from one of the experimental sessions.
2. Rational Voter Turnout
Consider two parties, A and B, competing for power. Citizens have strict political prefer-
ences for one or the other, chosen exogenously by Nature. We denote by q 2 (0; 1) the preference
split, i.e. the chance that any citizen is assigned (by Nature) a preference for party A (thus
1   q is the expected fraction of citizens that prefer party B). Without loss of generality, we
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assume that q  1=2; so that the A party is the underdog party (with smaller ex-ante support)
and the B party is the leader party (with larger ex-ante support). The indirect utility for a
citizen of preference type i, i = A;B, is increasing in the share of power that party i has. For
normalization purposes, we let the utility from full power to party iequal 1 for type i citizens
and 0 for the remaining citizens.19
Beside partisan preferences, the second dimension along which citizen di¤er from one an-
other is their cost of voting: each citizens cost of voting c is drawn from a distribution with
innitely di¤erentiable pdf f (c) over the support c 2 [0; c] ; with c > 0 (we denote the cdf as
F (c)).20 The cost of voting and the partisan preferences are two independent dimensions that
determine the type of a voter.
For any vote share V obtained by party A, an institutional system  determines power
shares PA (V ) 2 [0; 1] and PB (V ) = 1  PA (V ). Given the above normalization, these are the
reduced form benetcomponents of parties(respectively, voters) utility functions that will
determine the incentives to campaign (respectively, vote) in an institutional system. In this
section we study the base model in which parties do not campaign nor attempt to coordinate
or mobilize voters, hence turnout depends exclusively on voterscomparison between the policy
benets of voting for the preferred candidate and the opportunity costs of voting.
In terms of the size of the electorate, we nd it convenient to assume that the population
is nite but uncertain. There are n citizens who are able to vote at any given time, but such a
number is uncertain and distributed as a Poisson distribution with mean N :
n  e
 N (N)n
n!
Most analytical statements in the rst part of the paper are made for a large enough population,
namely they are true for everyN above a givenN . However, we will easily establish very similar
results for small elections via numerical computations.
Citizens have to choose to vote for party A, party B, or abstain. If a share  of A types
vote for A and a share  of B types vote for B, the expected turnout T is
T = q+ (1  q) 
19This normalization will allow us to match party utility and voterss utilities in a simple way under all the
institutional systems that will be considered.
20One could allow for the support to include negative voting costs. This trivially implies a zero compensation
e¤ect, as explained in the introduction.
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We look for a Bayesian equilibrium in which all voters of type A with a cost below a
threshold c vote for type A and voters of type B with a cost below c vote for B. So on
aggregate, type A citizens vote for A with chance  = F (c) and type B citizens vote for B
with chance  = F (c).
In any equilibrium strategy prole (; ), the expected marginal benet of voting, B, must
be equal to the cuto¤ cost of voting (indi¤erence condition for the citizen with the highest cost
among the equilibrium voters). Hence the equilibrium conditions can be written as
BA (; ) = F
 1(); BB (; ) = F
 1()
We compare the above equilibrium conditions in two systems which di¤er on the benet
side: a winner-take-all system ( =M) and a proportional power sharing system ( = P ).21
2.1. Winner take all system ( = M). In the M system the expected marginal benet of
voting BAM is the chance of being pivotal for a type A citizen, namely
BAM =
1X
k=0
 
e qN (Nq)k
k!
! 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)k
k!
!
1
2

1 +
(1  q)N
k + 1

namely the chance that an A citizen by voting either makes a tie and wins the coin toss or
breaks a tie where it would have lost the coin toss. Likewise, for the type B citizens we have
BBM =
1X
k=0
 
e qN (Nq)k
k!
! 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)k
k!
!
1
2

1 +
qN
k + 1

Equating the benet side to the cost side we obtain a system of two equations in (; ) (the
M system henceforth). We now show that asymptotically turnout for each party is zero as
a percentage of the population, but is innite in absolute numbers. Moreover, the ratio of
turnouts for each party remains nite.
Lemma 1. Any equilibrium solution (N ; N) to the M system (if it exists) has the following
three properties
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0; lim
N!1
NN = lim
N!1
NN =1; lim
N!1
N
N
2 (0;1)
21Recall that the interpretation is not restricted to electoral rules, as explained in the introduction. Two
countries with the same electoral rule can have very di¤erent mappings from electoral outcomes to power shares,
and this is the summary or reduced form variable that we are interested in and that a¤ects turnout.
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The above lemma allows us to use some approximations to show existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium for N large and also the following characterization results.22
Lemma 2. There exists an equilibrium (; ) in the M system. For uniqueness it su¢ ces that
F is weakly concave.23 The equilibrium has the following properties:
 Size e¤ect:
dTM
dN
< 0
 Partial underdog compensation e¤ect:
q < 1=2 =)  > ; q < (1  q)
The size e¤ect shows how the benet of voting declines for larger electorates, although we
will show that the rate of decline depends crucially on whether the parties do or do not have
the same support ex-ante. The partial underdog compensation shows that the party with less
supporters has higher relative expected turnout but lower expected turnout overall. We discuss
all these e¤ects in the following section.
2.2. Discussion of the M System. The partial underdog compensation arises from the equi-
librium relationship between the turnout rates for the two parties which for large electorates
can be expressed simply as (see Appendix)
(1) q
 
F 1()
2
= (1  q)  F 1()2
Why the above expression takes the specic quadratic form is a quantitative result, but in what
follows we highlight important qualitative ndings that derive from it. Since for heterogeneous
costs F 1() is increasing, then q < 1=2 implies an underdog compensation (i.e.  > ) that
must be partial (i.e. q < (1  q) ). As a consequence, we have a balanced election with a
50% expectation of victory from each side only when q = 1=2. With homogeneous costs the
result would be di¤erent: homogeneous costs mean that F 1 () = c = F 1 (), which implies
q = (1  q) ; i.e. full underdog compensation and a 50% chance of victory regardless of the
ex-ante preference split q.
To understand why the heterogeneity of the cost distribution is so important, assume for
instance that q = 1=3 so that the leader party has double the ex-ante support than the underdog
22We thank John Morgan for pointing out the importance of proving this non trivial lemma for the approx-
imation results and proofs that will follow.
23Or alternatively F 1 () weakly convex, which is a less straightforward but weaker condition.
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party. To have an election with a 50-50 chance of victory (i.e. q = (1  q) ), the underdog
party would have to turn out twice as much as the leader party. We claim that the latter
cannot happen unless citizens have homogenous costs. Suppose not; then on the benet side,
in a strategy prole with an ex-ante even outcome, the gross benet of voting is the same across
all voters (as they all individually face the same even environment). On the cost side, since
the underdog party has to turn out more, then we must have  = F (c) >  = F (c). With
heterogenous cost this means that the equilibrium cost thresholds would have to be di¤erent
c > c which, in turn, implies that the cost thresholds cannot both be equal to the benet.
In other words, the underdog supporters cannot fully rebalance the election because turning
out in a higher proportion means that types with a higher cost would have to turn out as well.
To have an equilibrium with full underdog compensation (same benet) we must have c = c
(same cost), which happens when F is constant so costs are homogeneous.
Conversely, as the costs become equal, the equilibrium must exhibit full underdog com-
pensation. The intuition is as follows. Suppose, to the contrary, that with homogenous costs a
pure strategy equilibrium with partial underdog compensation existed so the ex-ante underdog
is expected to lose the election. With such a strategy prole, a supporter of the underdog party
who is abstaining, by deviating and going to vote would bring the election closer to a tie, hence
he would have a higher benet than the benet of his fellow supporters of the underdog party
that were voting according to that strategy prole, a contradiction.
Assuming heterogenous costs determines more appealing features. First of all the underdog
compensation being just partial is what guarantees that the party with more ex-ante support
is the more likely winner of the election. This natural outcome is corroborated by observed
winning margins. Second, on the normative side, having the election result be determined by
a coin toss as in the homogenous cost full underdog compensation case is clearly unappealing
from a welfare perspective.24
24The fact that the 50-50 benchmark result is pervasive in the literature prompted the question of whether
it is of any use to have people vote at all as the preferences of the electorate are not reected in the outcome.
See e.g. Borgers (2004) and Krasa and Polborn (2010). A di¤erent line of work that tries to avoid the full
compensation undesirable outcome assumes that the preference split q remains unknown to voters: if so, then
the compensation e¤ect which rebalances the election and lowers welfare cannot be triggered properly. Hence
opinion polls, which reduce uncertainty about q; may be welfare reducing. See Goeree and Grosser (2007) and
Taylor and Yildirim (2010).
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The distinction between homogenous and heterogeneous costs and hence between full and
partial underdog compensation is also key for turnout predictions. The di¤erent equilibria with
di¤erent cost assumptions, namely a 50-50 outcome versus a non 50-50 outcome, imply very
di¤erent overall turnout numbers in large elections. In fact, the benet of voting and hence the
turnout are proportional to
BM  e
 
p
q 
p
(1 q)
2
N
p
N
In the homogenous cost case, in which q = (1  q) ; this implies that turnout declines at
the rate N 1=2: In the heterogeneous cost case, where q 6= (1   q) unless q = 1=2; turnout
declines at an exponential rate for q 6= 1=225 and declines at the algebraic rate N 1=2 when
q = 1=2.26
Even though the nature of our work is positive, we want to conclude this discussion of the
M system with a simple welfare corollary:
Corollary 3. Asymptotically, for the population N going to innity, neither subsidies nor
penalties for voters can improve total expected utility in the M system.
This could be easily shown by adapting the proof of proposition 5 in Krasa and Polborn
(2009), since their model is similar to our model of the M system but with a positive voting
cost lower bound c > 0. They show that in the limit the optimal subsidy to voters converges
to c. Thus, when one considers the same model but with zero as lower bound c = 0, the
optimal subsidy in the limit must be zero.27 Intuitively, on the one hand introducing a subsidy
is unnecessary since asymptotically the party with larger ex-ante support always wins the
election in any case. On the other hand, introducing a penalty for voting would bring us back
the ine¢ cient lower bound c > 0 in the voting cost distribution.
25For q 6= 1=2 the argument of the exponential function diverges to  1 (see Lemma 1 and Proposition 7).
26Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) obtain a similar result on rates of convergence in a model in which
two candidates receive votes as binomial random variables. They assume no abstention, so the number of votes
can be seen as ips of identical coins with a certain bias q. They show that if you toss an even number n of
coins, the chance of obtaining the same number of heads and tails (the chance of a tie) drops asymptotically
like N 1=2 when the coins are unbiased (q = 1=2) and exponentially if the coins are biased (q < 1=2).
27Krasa and Polborn (2010) obtain the ine¢ cient full compensation result with a non degenerate cost distri-
bution because its support [c; c] is bounded away from zero. Hence, unlike what we obtain in Lemma 1, only a
nite number of voters will go to vote even when the population N grows unboundedly large. Asymptotically
their model is isomorphic to a homogenous cost model with cost c > 0.
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2.3. Proportional Power Sharing System ( = P ). With proportional power sharing (P
system) the share of power is proportional to the vote share obtained in the election. So if
(a; b) are the absolute numbers of votes for each party, the power of parties A and B would be
respectively
 
a
a+b
; b
a+b

:28
The expected marginal benet of voting BiP for party i is the expected increase in the vote
share for the preferred party induced by a single vote, namely
BAP =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
 
e qN (qN)a
a!
 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)b
b!
!
a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
  a
a+ b
!
BBP =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
 
e qN (qN)a
a!
 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)b
b!
!
b+ 1
a+ b+ 1
  b
a+ b
!
In this case, unlike in the M system, we have double summations because an A supporter,
for instance, has an impact on the electoral outcome not only in the event of a tied election
(a = b and a = b   1), but also in all the other cases a 6= b. In the P system voters always
have some impact on the electoral outcome albeit very small, whereas in the M system voters
have a large impact in the very small chance event that a = b and zero impact otherwise. A
non obvious quantitative question is to compare how the expected impacts of a voter in the M
and in the P systems decline with the electorate size N . After some manipulation the double
summations above can be expressed in a simple form.
Lemma 4. The marginal benet of voting in the P system has the closed form
BAP =
(1  q) 
NT 2
 
 
((1  q) )2   (q)2 + (1  q)  1
N
2T 2
!
e NT(2)
BBP =
q
NT 2
+
 
((1  q) )2   (q)2   q 1
N
2T 2
!
e NT
The above closed form is a very lucky outcome and it allows us to show that asymptotically
turnout for each party is zero as a percentage of the population, but is innite in absolute
numbers, moreover the party turnout ratio stays nite, similarly to what we obtained for the
M model.
28We assume that if nobody votes, power is shared equally, namely
a
a+ b
=
b
a+ b
=
1
2
for a = b = 0
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Lemma 5. Any solution (N ; N) (if it exists) to the P system has the following three properties
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0; lim
N!1
NN = lim
N!1
NN =1; lim
N!1
N
N
2 (0;1)
As in the M system, the above lemma allows us to use some approximations to show
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium for N large and also the following characterization
results.
Lemma 6. In the P system there is always a unique equilibrium (; ). The equilibrium has
the following properties:
 Size e¤ect: dTP
dN
< 0
 Partial underdog e¤ect: q < 1=2 =)  > ; q < (1  q)
The relation describing quantitatively the underdog compensation under the P system can
be expressed simply for large electorates as (see Appendix)
(3) qF 1() = (1  q)F 1()
the above linear expression is slightly di¤erent from the quadratic expression (1) describing
the underdog compensation under the M system.
2.4. Main Comparison. The size e¤ect and the underdog compensation e¤ect, though qual-
itatively similar, are quantitatively di¤erent across the two institutional systems. We now turn
to the implications of these di¤erences and to the comparison of turnout incentives across sys-
tems. Turnout is higher in a proportional power sharing system when there is a favorite party,
while it is higher in a winner take all system if the election is even.
Proposition 7. .
 Comparative turnout: for any q 2 (0; 1), 9 Nq such that for N > Nq
TM > TP for q = 1=2
TP > TM for q 6= 1=2
 Comparative underdog compensation:
1  q
q
=

P
P
n+1
=

M
M
2n+1
where n  1 is the lowest integer for which dnF 1
dxn
jx=0 2 (0;1).
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Regarding the comparative underdog compensation, we have already explained in section
2.2 that with heterogeneous costs full compensation is impossible in equilibrium, and a similar
explanation holds for the proportional power sharing system. In both systems the underdog
compensation is partial: the ex-ante favorite party obtains the majority of the votes in a large
election, but the underdog party has a higher turnout of its supporters. The above proposition
shows that the underdog compensation is larger in the P system, namely
(4) q < 1=2 ) P=P > M=M > 1
Compared to the P system, in the M system minority voters are always more discouraged to
vote relative to majority voters. This result could also be stated as a higher relative winning
margin in the M system than in the P for any given preference split q, where the relative
winning margin W is dened as29
W :=
jq  (1  q) j
T
Regarding turnout, the intuition behind the turnout result relies on how fast the marginal
benet of voting decreases in the two models as the electorate gets larger. The M system has
two asymptotic regimes: it decreases exponentially for q 6= 1=2 and for q = 1
2
it decreases at
the algebraic rate of N 1=2. Since we have only partial underdog compensation, then for any
q 6= 1=2 the majority party is always the more likely side to win. Hence the chance of a tied
election, which is what drives rational voters to turn out, is much smaller than in the case
q = 1=2 for any population size N .30
The benet from voting in the P system drops asymptotically at the intermediate rate of
N 1. This rate is independent of q as in the power sharing system the event that a voter is
pivotal or the chance of a tied election have no special relevance.
29This result is not obvious ex-ante as there are two competing e¤ects: in the M system, while minority voters
 are discouraged to vote, also (and for the same reason) majority voters  are. So, it is not clear whether =
should be smaller or greater in the M system than in the P system (where neither e¤ect is present).
30The two rates of convergence derived above do not depend on the (Poisson) population uncertainty in
this model. For instance, Herrera and Martinelli (2006) analyze a majority rule election without population
uncertainty. They introduce aggregate uncertainty in a di¤erent way, which allows to obtain a closed form for
the chance of being pivotal, namely (a+b)!
2a+b+1a!b!
. As it can be seen using Stirlings approximation, that marginal
benet for large a and b has exactly the square root decline on the diagonal (a = b) and the exponential decline
o¤ the diagonal (a = !b, ! 6= 1) :
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It is perhaps now intuitive that a winner take all system, unlike a proportional power sharing
one, should have two quite di¤erent rates of convergence regimes (although as we explained
this is not the case with a degenerate cost distribution). Be that as it may, only an explicit
computation could determine that the rate of convergence in the P system is quantitatively in
between the two rates of convergence in the M system: N 1 2  N 1=2; e N :
In order to illustrate the comparison in terms of turnout as well as underdog compensation
e¤ects, we now turn to a numerical example.
2.5. Example. Consider the cost distribution family (z > 0): F (c) = c1=z with c 2 [0; 1] :
This example yields an explicit solution for the P system, i.e.
P =
0B@ 1
N
(1  q) q 1z+1 (1  q) 1z+1
q (1  q) 1z+1 + (1  q) q 1z+1
2
1CA
1
z+1
P =
0B@ 1
N
q
1  q
(1  q) q 1z+1 (1  q) 1z+1
q (1  q) 1z+1 + (1  q) q 1z+1
2
1CA
1
z+1
The M system equilibrium has no closed form solution, namely (M ; M) jointly solve
M =

q
1  q
 1
2z+1
M ; 
z
M =
e
 N
p
(1 q)M 
p
qM
2
p
N
 p
qM +
p
(1  q) M
4
p
 (q (1  q)MM)1=4
!
Setting N = 3000 and z = 5, the numerical solutions to the M system yield a clear
illustration of the comparative result of proposition 7. In the picture below we compare, as the
preference split q varies, the turnout T in the M system (continuous line) and in the P system
(dashed line).
Figure 1: Turnout as a function of q in the M (continuous) and P (dashed) models (z = 5;
N = 3000).
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When one party (e.g. party B) has the ex-ante advantage over the other party (A), we
have a higher turnout in the P system. Numerically, for instance when q = 1=3; we have
q = 1=3   = W T
P 24:8% 22% 1:27 27:8% 23%
M 7:1% 6:7% 1:06 30:9% 6:8%
Note also in both the M and the P systems the presence of the underdog compensation
( > ) which is partial (q < (1  q) ). Moreover, note the higher underdog compensation
= in the P system and consequently the higher relative winning margin W in the M system.
Whereas when the election is close and no party has an ex ante advantage, i.e. q = 1=2,
turnout T in the M system surpasses the turnout in the P system
q = 1=2   T
P 23:5% 23:5% 23:5%
M 40:9% 40:9% 40:9%
Note for di¤erent qs the much larger variability of turnout numbers T in the M system when
compared to the P system.
To compare the underdog compensations in general, the picture below illustrates how
the ratio = varies with q in the P system (dashed line) and in the M system (continuous
line). Contrast these decreasing curves with the steeper one that is obtained in the M system
under homogeneous cost (dotted line) when there is full underdog compensation, the election
is expected to be tied and the winning margin is zero regardless of the initial preference split.
In sum, this example illustrates how the underdog compensation is higher in a proportional
power sharing system, while the turnout is lower in a proportional power sharing system only
when the distribution of party supporters is symmetric.
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Figure 2: Underdog compensation = as a function of q in the P (dashed), M (continuous)
and M with homogenous cost (dotted) models (z = 5).
3. Robustness and Extensions
The basic pivotal voter model analyzed in the last section is idealized in several ways. The
purpose of this section is to show that many of the results in this idealized version extend to
alternative models of turnout that have been proposed, and to show that the basic approach is
quite exible and can be extended to accommodate a much broader array of political systems.
We consider a number of generalizations or modications of the basic model studied in the last
section: we rst of all generalize the model to allow for intermediate systems between the two
extremes of P and M; then, in section 3.2, we analyze the pivotal model without population
uncertainty and allowing for such intermediate systems; third, we show in section 3.3 that
the main comparative results obtained using the pivotal model (with or without population
uncertainty and allowing for intermediate systems) extend even when studying the problem
using group-based turnout models, like the mobilization model or the ethical voting model;
nally, we will show that the main comparative results on turnout are not a¤ected by the
number of parties present in a proportional election system.
3.1. Intermediate Power Sharing Rules. The model is simple enough that we can accom-
modate a wide range of intermediate power sharing rules between P and M using a single
parameter in the payo¤ function. Intermediate systems are plausible and perhaps even more
realistic than either of the extremes. For example, even in a winner take all system like the
U.S. Presidential race, a large winning margin carry with it added benets to the winner due
to a "mandate" e¤ect, and larger winning margins for the President can carry over to a larger
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majority in one of both houses of Congress, via a "coattails" e¤ect.31 Also, the fact that the
legislative branch in a M system has leverage over the executive branch and the presidency
will tend to smooth out the winner-take-all payo¤ function in the direction of a proportional
system. On the ip side, in parliamentary systems that require the formation of a coalitional
governing cabinet, a party that is fortunate to win a clear majority of seats outright has much
less incentive (or in some cases none at all) to compromise with other parties in order to govern
e¤ectively. The expected vote shares for party A and B are
V =
q
T
; 1  V = (1  q) 
T
In a  power sharing system, payo¤s as a function of the vote share is represented by standard
contest success function32, where  ranges from 1 to 1.
PA (V ) =
V 
V  + (1  V ) ; P
B
 (V ) =
(1  V )
V  + (1  V )
The two extreme cases correspond to P (=1) and M ( =1).33
The gure below illustrates the power share payo¤PA as a function of the vote share V for
three power sharing parameters , namely:  = 1 (i.e. the P system, dashed line),  = 5 (i.e.
an intermediate power sharing system, continuous line), and  ! 1 (i.e. a pure M system,
dotted line).
Figure 3: Power Sharing Functions in the P (dashed), approaching the M system (continuous)
and pure M system (dotted).
31For an empirical analysis of such e¤ects, see Ferejohn and Calvert (1984) and Calvert and Ferejohn (1983).
See also Golder (2006).
32See for instance Hirshleifer (1989), among others. When nobody votes ( =  = 0) assume equal shares
(V = 1=2):
33There are other ways to introduce a proportionality parameter. In a more recent paper, Faravelli and
Sanchez-Pages (2012) model it as a linear combination of PR and SMP.
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3.2. The nite voter model with no population uncertainty. For the M system, this
model reduces to the one studied by Levine and Palfrey (2007) and Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1985). The formulation of the equilibrium conditions in that model extend to the P system
and also to any arbitrary  power sharing system. Let NA denote the number of voters with
a preference for party A and NB = N   NA denote the number of voters with a preference
for party B, and assume without loss of generality that NA  NB and both NA and NB are
common knowledge. As before, a symmetric equilibrium is characterized by two cuto¤ levels,
one for each party, c and c, with corresponding expected turnout levels equal to  = F (c)
and  = F (c). The equilibrium conditions for a  power sharing system is characterized as
follows.34
Given expected turnout rates in the two parties,  and ; the expected marginal benet
of voting
 
BAP ; B
B
P

of a party A and party B citizen are equal to respectively:
(5)
NA 1X
j=0
NBX
k=0

(j + 1)
(j + 1) + k
  j

j + k

NA   1
j

NB
k

j(1  )NA 1 jk(1  )NB k
(6)
NB 1X
j=0
NAX
k=0

(j + 1)
(j + 1) + k
  j

j + k

NB   1
j

NA
k

j(1  )NB 1 jk(1  )NA k
Where the rst term in brackets in the summation is the increase in power share, as derived
from vote shares, and the remaining terms represent the probability of the vote share being
equal to j
j+k
without your vote, given turnout rates  and .35 The equilibrium condition for
cP and c

P are given by:
cP = B
A
P ; c

P = B
B
P
While closed form analytical expressions of the equilibria do not exist, they are easily
computed numerically. The gures below show the equilibrium solution as a function of , for
the following parameters.
34Kartal (2010) and Faravelli and Sanchez-Pages (2012) use this nite voter approach to compare turnout in
M and PR systems.
35By convention, we denote jj+k = :5 if j = k = 0.
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Figure 4: Turnout as  increases from PR approaching MR.
In the close to even preference split case (NA = 4; NB = 5), turnout increases as we ap-
proach the majoritarian system because winning the election becomes paramount so competi-
tion becomes ercer.
In the large majority case, i.e. an uneven preference split (NA = 2; NB = 7), turnout is
(slightly) decreasing. As we approach the majoritarian system, the incentive to vote is reduced:
winning becomes all that matters and the underdog has a small chance of winning when pref-
erences are uneven. We see in both cases the presence of the underdog e¤ect. The magnitude
of the underdog e¤ect is gradually decreasing as we approach the majoritarian system, which
conrms and extends the previously obtained result (4).
3.3. Group-based Models.
3.3.1. Mobilization Model. Morton (1987, 1991), Cox and Munger (1989), Shachar and Nale-
bu¤ (1999) and others have proposed models based on group mobilization, where parties can
mobilize and coordinate citizens to go vote. There is evidence that mobilization e¤ects play
some role in turnout variation across elections and across electoral systems. Even though we
believe that the analysis conducted so far provides per se many new insights, we want to extend
the analysis to other turnout models. The basic idea behind these models is that the positive
externality of voting among supporters of the same party is somehow internalized, leading to
higher turnout. Moreover, the electoral rules - especially as the rules e¤ect eventual power
sharing between the parties can have a strong e¤ect on turnout. and so regardless of the size
of the population turnout is high.
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A group mobilization model a la Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999) where parties campaign
e¤orts and spending are able to mobilize and coordinate citizens to go vote, is one example
that shows how our results can be adapted to this approach. In that model, each group
can "purchase" turnout of its party members by engaging in costly get-out-the-vote e¤orts.
Thus, parties trade o¤ mobilization costs for higher expected vote shares, taking as given the
mobilization choice of the other party.
3.3.2. Ethical Voter Model. A second approach that is also grounded in group-oriented behavi-
ors is the ethical voter model of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), which assumes that citizens are
rule utilitarianso they act as one. This involves an equilibrium between two party-planners
on each side A and B. In this solution each planner looks at the total benet from the outcome
of the election considering the total cost of voting incurred by the supporters of his side, taking
the other planners turnout strategy as given. The logic of the ethical voter models is similar to
the group mobilization models. They are almost identical on the benet side but di¤er slightly
on the cost side. In the case of the ethical voter model, one gets almost exactly the same kind
of partial compensation as in the pivotal voter model with non-negative costs.
3.3.3. Common analysis. We describe the ethical voter model and mobilization model to-
gether because they are operationally similar. As in our basic model, the population is
a continuum of measure one, divided into q A supporters and (1  q) B supporters. For
any voting cost thresholds (c; c) ; i.e., given that the voter participation for each side is
( = F (c) ;  = F (c)), turnout is again T = q + (1   q): We assume F is weakly con-
cave.36
Both models have identical group benet. In a  power sharing system described above,
the marginal group benets to the two parties, with respect to (c; c) are, respectively:
dPA
dc
=
dPA
dV

(1  q) 
T 2

qf (c) ;
dPA
dc
=  dP
B

dV
q
T 2

(1  q) f (c)
where:
dPA
dV
=  dP
B

dV
=

V (1  V )
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2
36The same condition was needed to have uniqueness of a solution in the rational voter M-model.
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3.3.4. Solution to the Mobilization Model. A mobilization model assumes that more campaign
spending by a party brings more votes for the party according to an exogenous technology.
In major elections, candidates and parties engage in hugely expensive get-out-the-vote drives.
Empirical evidence suggests that these drives are e¤ective. We consider a very simple version
of group mobilization. We assume the cost for a party of mobilizing to the polls all his sup-
porters with voting cost below c is l (c), where c 2 [0; c] and l is increasing, convex and twice
di¤erentiable. We also assume it is innitely costly for a party to turn out all its supporters:
l (c) =1.
For the mobilization model the rst order conditions that characterize the solution are:
dPA
dV

(1  q) 
T 2

qf (c) = l
0 (c) ;
dPA
dV
q
T 2

(1  q) f (c) = l0 (c)
which yields the following zero underdog compensation condition
l0 (c)
f (c)
=
l0 (c)
f (c)
=) T =  = ; c = c
that is, both parties turn out the same proportion of their supporters.37
The mobilization model is reduced to one equation in one unknown, equating marginal
benet (MB) and marginal cost
(7) MB = 
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 = 

q
1 q

h
1 +

q
1 q
i2 = G ()
where
G () := 
l0 (c)
f (c)
is increasing in . The solution is hence unique and it exists because l (c) = 1. The solution
has the following properties:
(1) Turnout T =  increases when the marginal benet (MB) increases;
(2) As  goes to innity (M model) the marginal benet goes to innity when q = 1=2 and
goes to zero otherwise;
(3) When  = 1 (P model) the marginal benet
( q1 q )
[1+( q1 q )]
2 is positive for all q 2 (0; 1) and
peaks but stays nite at q = 1=2:
37We need to assume F weakly concave (as in the rational voter M model) to guarantee the LHS expressions
above are increasing in their argument.
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The picture below shows the marginal benet as a function of the closeness of the election
q for  = 1 (i.e. the P system, dashed line), and for  = 5 (i.e. approximating the M system,
continuous line).
Figure 5: Marginal benet as a function of q in the P system (dashed) and approaching the M
system (continuous).
3.3.5. Solution to the Ethical Voter Model. The ethical voter model assumes that citizens are
rule utilitarianso they act as one. This means that we have to nd a party-planner solution
on each side A and B. In this solution each planner looks at the total benet from the outcome
of the election considering the total cost of voting incurred by the supporters of his side.38 The
cost of turning out the voters for the social planner on side A is the total cost born by all the
citizens on side A that vote, namely
C (c) := q
Z c
0
cf (c) dc
The citizens with cost below the planner-chosen cost threshold c vote because ethical voter
models assume citizens get an exogenous benetD (larger than their private voting cost c  c)
for doing their partin following the optimal rule established by the planner. We have as rst
order conditions
dPA
dV

(1  q) 
T 2

qf (c) = qcf (c)
dPA
dV
q
T 2

(1  q) f (c) = (1  q) cf (c)
38We assume collectivism, so the planner on each side, A and B, only looks at the total cost of voting of
the voters on his side. The results would not have changed had we assumed altruismas in Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006): each planner takes into account the cost of voting of all citizens that vote regardless of their
side.
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which gives the condition
qF 1 () = (1  q) F 1 ()
The above is a partial underdog compensation condition which happens to be the same as the
partial underdog compensation condition (3) obtained in the P system of the rational voter
model.
The solution for the ethical voter model for general  is more complicated than the group
mobilization model in  power sharing system, as the underdog compensation is strictly partial
(not zero), so  6=  and we maintain the two equations in two unknowns, that is
qF 1 () = (1  q) F 1 () = 

q
(1 q)

h
1 +

q
(1 q)
i2
However, given that the underdog compensation is not full the comparative statics is similar to
the case of zero compensation obtained in the mobilization model. Namely if a solution (; )
exists,39 then  and ; and hence T; increase when the marginal benet increases. Taking limits,
as  goes to innity (M model) the marginal benet on the RHS goes to innity when q = 1=2
and to zero otherwise. When  = 1 (P model) the marginal benet
( q1 q )
[1+( q1 q )]
2 is positive for all
q 2 (0; 1) and peaks but stays nite at q = 1=2:
Note that if the underdog compensation were full (which happens for instance with homo-
geneous costs) the marginal benet would become
MB = 

q
(1 q)

h
1 +

q
(1 q)
i2 = 4
so the result would be di¤erent: regardless of the initial preference split q; turnout would
increase with the intensity of the contest : As explained, the rational voter model with homo-
genous cost gives an equivalent result.
3.4. Extending the basic model to k-parties. This section proposes one possible way to
extend the turnout model for P systems to k parties. The extension is meant to be illustrative
of possible directions the model can be generalized. All the analysis in the paper up to this
point is conducted by altering the mapping from vote shares to power shares but keeping, for
simplicity, the two-party assumption. However, as we show in this extension, the comparative
results in terms of turnout do not necessarily depend on the number of parties under the P
39Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) provide specic conditions on the voting cost
distributions that guarantee existence.
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system. Below we explicitly compute the equilibrium for any number of parties in the P system
with sincere voting. This allows us to obtain a simple comparative statics result within the
proportional power sharing system: turnout increases in the number of parties.40
To keep notation simple, we illustrate only the three party case. Dene
A := qAN; B := qBN; C := qCN; with: qA + qB + qC = 1
The marginal benet41 for party A is
BAP =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
1X
c=0

e AAa
a!

e BBb
b!

e CCc
c!

a+ 1
a+ b+ c+ 1
  a
a+ b+ c

Lemma 8. The marginal benet has the closed form
BAP =

1  A
A+B + C

1  e (A+B+C)
A+B + C
+

A
A+B+C
  1
3

e (A+B+C)
By symmetry the expressions BBP and B
C
P for parties B or C are straightforward.
For any number of parties the following comparative statics result holds.
Proposition 9. .
 The comparison between turnout in the P system and the M system continues to hold
even when there are multiple parties in the P system.
 If parties are symmetric, turnout in the P system increases as the number of parties
increases.
The turnout comparison result remains unchanged with more parties because the marginal
benet of voting in the P system always declines asymptotically at the intermediate rate 1=N ,
as was the case for the P system with two parties.
40The extension to multiple parties presented here could be useful especially for future research, because
it could help to open a bit the reduced form proportionality of inuence parameter. With many parties the
reduced form linear mapping from vote shares to power shares a la Lizzeri and Persico (2001) can be explicitly
obtained from a standard post election legislative bargaining model of alternating o¤ers a la Baron and Ferejohn
(1989): Snyder, Ting and Ansolabehere (2005) analyze the conditions under which the expected power shares
are proportional to the vote shares.
41Assume again that if nobody votes, power is shared equally, namely
a
a+ b+ c
= 1=3 for a = b = c = 0
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Within the 1=N order of magnitude of the size e¤ect, turnout increases when there are more
symmetric parties. This is consistent with the fact that smaller parties obtain a higher turnout
in the P system. The intuition for the latter follows from the following two observations. First,
xing the number of votes z for all other parties, the vote share increase for party A is
a+ 1
a+ z + 1
  a
a+ z

=

a2 + a
z
+ 2a+ 1 + z
 1
which is larger for smaller values of the random variable a; i.e. the number of votes for party
A. Second, for a given a; in the marginal benet BAP (see (2) and expressions above) a smaller
party (i.e. a party with a smaller qA) assigns larger probability weight

e AAa
a!

to small values
of a:
4. Experimental Analysis
4.1. Description. Even though the point estimates of turnout when using the costly voting
rational model are much lower than real turnout levels in elections, as is well known, there
is no reason to believe that the comparative predictions of the rational model shouldnt be of
guidance. To verify that indeed the comparative results of the paper correspond to actual voting
behavior, we bring the model presented in section 2 to the laboratory. In laboratory elections
we can have only a nite number of voters, but the model is easily adapted to this case. The
equilibrium conditions for our laboratory implementation of the model, with nite electorates
and no population uncertainty42, are given below. It is straightforward to exactly characterize
symmetric Bayesian equilibrium for these nite environments, and comparative statics that are
similar to the Poisson model can be computed directly from these exact equilibrium solutions.
In what follows, let NA denote the number of voters with a preference for party A and
NB = N  NA denote the number of voters with a preference for party B, and assume without
loss of generality that NA  NB. As before, a symmetric equilibrium is characterized by two
cuto¤ levels, one for each party, c and c, with corresponding expected turnout levels equal
to  = F (c) and  = F (c). The equilibrium conditions are slightly di¤erent for the M and
P systems, and these are derived next.
4.1.1. Equilibrium conditions for M. Given expected turnout rates in the two parties,  and
 the expected marginal benet of voting for a party A citizen corresponds to the limit of
42The reason to consider known population size is that the analytical computations with the Poisson game
approach apply only to the limiting case of very large electorates, which is not feasible in the laboratory.
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expressions (5) and (6) when  goes to innity. This reduces to:
BAM =
1
2
24 PNA 1k=0  NA 1k  NBk k(1  )NA 1 kk(1  )NB k+PNA 1
k=0
 
NA 1
k
 
NB
k+1

k(1  )NA 1 kk+1(1  )NB 1 k
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BBM =
1
2
24 PminfNA;NB 1gk=0  NAk  NB 1k k(1  )NA kk(1  )NB 1 k+PNA 1
k=0
 
NA
k+1
 
NB 1
k

k+1(1  )NA 1 kk(1  )NB 1 k
35
where 1
2
is the value of creating or breaking a tie. In each expression, the rst summation is the
probability of your vote breaking a tie, and the second summation is the probability of your
vote creating a tie, given turnout rates  and . The equilibrium conditions for cM and c

M are
given by:
cM = B
A
M ; c

M = B
B
M
4.1.2. Equilibrium conditions for P. Given expected turnout rates in the two parties,  and 
the expected marginal benet of voting for a party A citizen is obtained from expressions (5)
and (6) by setting  = 1 :
BAP =
NA 1X
j=0
NBX
k=0

j + 1
j + 1 + k
  j
j + k

NA   1
j

NB
k

j(1  )NA 1 jk(1  )NB k
BBP =
NB 1X
j=0
NAX
k=0

j + 1
j + 1 + k
  j
j + k

NB   1
j

NA
k

j(1  )NB 1 jk(1  )NA k
Where the rst term in the summation is the increase in vote share and the second term
is the probability of the vote share being equal to j
j+k
without your vote, given turnout rates
 and .43 The equilibrium condition for cP and c

P are given by:
cP = B
A
P ; c

P = B
B
P
4.1.3. Experimental design and parameters. All our electorates in the experiment have exactly
N = 9 voters, with three di¤erent NA treatments: NA = 2; 3; 4. We consider two di¤erent
distributions of voter costs. In our low cost (or, equivalently, high benet) elections ci is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,.3]. In our high cost (or, equivalently, low benet)
elections ci is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,.55]. Table 1 below gives the symmetric
43By convention, we denote jj+k = :5 if j = k = 0.
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equilibrium expected turnout levels (by party and total turnout) for each treatment, rounded
to two decimal places.
NA NB cmax Rule #Subjects #Sessions #Elections  
 NA+NB
N
4 5 .3 M 18 2 100 .60 72 .67
3 6 .3 M 18 2 100 .51 .52 .52
2 7 .3 M 18 2 100 .45 .40 .41
4 5 .55 M 81 9 450 .46 .45 .46
3 6 .55 M 81 9 450 .41 .37 .39
2 7 .55 M 18 2 100 .38 .30 .32
4 5 .3 P 18 2 100 .48 .43 .45
3 6 .3 P 18 2 100 .55 .39 .45
2 7 .3 P 18 2 100 .67 .36 .43
4 5 .55 P 18 2 100 .35 .31 .33
3 6 .55 P 18 2 100 .40 .29 .32
2 7 .55 P 18 2 100 .48 .26 .31
Table 1. Design summary and equilibrium turnout rates.
There are ve main theoretical hypotheses comparing turnout in the M and P voting
systems in the elections we study. We state these below:
H1 For the larger party, turnout is higher in M than in P. For the smaller party, turnout is
higher in M than in P in competitive races, but the reverse is true in lopsided races.
H2 Total expected turnout is higher under M than under P.
H3 The competition e¤ect is reversed for the smaller party in the proportional vote system.
That is, for the smaller party, turnout decreases as their share of the electorate increases.
Under M, the usual competition e¤ect applies to both parties: elections that are expected
to be closer lead to higher turnout.44
H4 The competition e¤ect on total expected turnout is negligible in P elections.
H5 In all P elections we study, there is an underdog e¤ect. There is an underdog e¤ect in all
M elections, except for reverse underdog e¤ects in the low cost 5-4 and 6-3 M elections.
In the experimental section we will return to these ve predictions of the known population
model.
44In the general model with population uncertainty we were not able to obtain general results on the competi-
tion e¤ects, whereas the numerical analysis of the known population case allows for these additional predictions.
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4.2. Procedures. A total of 171 subjects participated in 1900 elections across 19 sessions.
Each session consisted of two parts with 50 nine-voter elections in each part. The parameters
were the same in all elections within a part, but in each session exactly one parameter was
changed between part I and part II. In all sessions the same voting rule (M or P) was used
in all 100 elections. For all of the treatments except for the 7-2 elections, the distribution of
voting costs were the same for all 100 elections. Half of these sessions were conducted with
part I having 5-4 elections and part II having 6-3 elections. The other half of the sessions
reversed the order so the 6-3 elections were in part I and the 5-4 elections in part II.45 For
the 7-2 elections, half the elections in a session were conducted with cmax = 55 and half with
cmax = 30, in both orders. Subjects were informed of the exact parameters (NA, NB, Cmax and
the voting rule) at the beginning of each part. Before each election, each subject was randomly
assigned to either group A or group B and assigned a voting cost, drawn independently from
the uniform distribution between 0 and cmax, in integer increments. Therefore, each subject
gained experience as a member of the majority and minority party in both parts of the session.
Instructions were read aloud so everyone could hear, and Powerpoint slides were projected
in front of the room to help explain the rules. After the instructions were read, subjects were
walked through two practice rounds and then were required to correctly answer all the questions
on a computerized comprehension quiz before the experiment began. After the rst 50 rounds,
a very short set of new instructions were read aloud to explain the change of parameters.
The wording in the instructions was written so as to induce as neutral an environment
as possible.46 There was no mention of voting or winning or losing or costs. The labels were
abstract. The smaller group was referred to the alpha group (A) and the larger group was
referred to as the beta group (B). Individuals were asked in each round to choose X or Y. For
the M treatment, if more members of A(B) chose X than members of B(A) chose X, then each
member of A(B) received 100 and each member of group B(A) received 0. In case of a tie, each
member of each group received the expected value of a fair coin toss, 50. For the P treatment,
each voter received a share of 100 proportional to the number of voters in their party that
chose X compared to the number of voters in the other party that chose X. The voting cost
was implemented as an opportunity cost and was referred to as a "Y bonus". It was added
to a players earnings if that player chose Y instead of X. If a player chose X, that player did
45The order was 5-4 followed by 6-3 in both P/55 sessions due to an error in one of the program les for
running the experiment.
46A sample of the instructions from one of the sessions is in Appendix E.
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not receive their Y bonus in that election. Y-bonuses were randomly redrawn in every election,
independently for each subject, and subjects were only told their own Y bonus. Bonuses were
integer valued and took on values from 0 to 30 in the low cost treatment and 0 to 55 in the
high cost treatment. Payo¤s were denominated in points that were converted to US dollars at
a pre-announced rate.47 Each subject earned the sum of their earnings across all elections. All
decisions took place through computers, using the Multistage experimental software program.48
The experiments were conducted in 2011, and subjects were registered students at Caltech.49
Each session lasted about forty ve minutes and subjects earned between eleven and seventeen
dollars, in addition to a xed payment for showing up on time.
4.3. Experimental Results. Table 2 summarizes the observed turnout rates by treatment.
The table reports turnout by party and also total turnout for each experimental treatment.
The last three columns give the equilibrium turnout levels. The table (and the ones that
follow) reports standard errors clustered at the individual voter level. A statistical comparison
of the average turnout rates with the equilibrium turnout rates indicates that the data are
quantitatively closely aligned with the theoretical predictions from the pivotal voter model: in
10 out of 12 cases, b is not signicantly di¤erent from , at the 5% signicance level; in 10
out of 12 cases, b is not signicantly di¤erent from , at the 5% signicance level; and in 10
out of 12 cases, bT is not signicantly di¤erent from T , at the 5% signicance level. Besides
statistical signicance, the di¤erences are generally small in quantitative terms as well: 25 of
the 36 turnout rates are within ve percentage points of the theoretical rates.
47Each point was equal to $.01.
48http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu
49Data for the high cost M 5-4 and 6-3 elections are from an earlier study with UCLA students as subjects
(Levine and Palfrey 2007), which used the same Multistage software and the same protocol.
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NA NB cmax Rule b b bT   T 
4 5 .3 M 0.622* (.047) 0.636* (.050) 0.630* (.042) .60 .72 .67
3 6 .3 M 0.513* (.046) 0.520* (.055) 0.518* (.044) .51 .52 .52
2 7 .3 M 0.490* (.073) 0.360* (.060) 0.389* (.054) .45 .40 .41
4 5 .55 M 0.479* (.026) 0.451* (.028) 0.464* (.021) .46 .45 .46
3 6 .55 M 0.436* (.025) 0.399* (.030) 0.411* (.022) .41 .37 .39
2 7 .55 M 0.330* (.045) 0.284* (.037) 0.294* (.031) .38 .30 .32
4 5 .3 P 0.547 (.029) 0.486 (.028) 0.513 (.026) .48 .43 .45
3 6 .3 P 0.547* (.054) 0.465* (.048) 0.492* (.040) .55 .39 .45
2 7 .3 P 0.600 (.036) 0.421* (.047) 0.461* (.038) .67 .36 .43
4 5 .55 P 0.362* (.024) 0.370* (.039) 0.367* (.024) .35 .31 .33
3 6 .55 P 0.477 (.037) 0.305* (.037) 0.362* (.028) .40 .29 .32
2 7 .55 P 0.515* (.027) 0.320 (.029) 0.363 (.024) .48 .26 .31
Table 2. Observed turnout rates. Subject-clustered standard error in parenthesis.
*cannot reject theory at 5%
Using these turnout data, we next turn to the ve hypotheses generated by the theoretical
equilibrium turnout levels. Recall that there are ve main theoretical predictions from the
pivotal voter model about di¤erences between turnout in the M and P voting systems in the
elections we study. We go through each of these briey below.
H1 For the larger party, turnout is higher in M than P. For the smaller party,
turnout is higher in M than in P in competitive races, but the reverse is true
in lopsided races. We nd support for this hypothesis except for the larger party in
extreme landslide elections (NA = 2) where turnout rates are slightly higher in P than
M. The two cases where the sign is not correct, the di¤erence is not statistically di¤erent
from 0. For smaller parties for one of the intermediate case between highly competitive
races and lopsided races (6-3) the sign is not consistent with theory, but the empirical
di¤erence (-0.04) is not signicantly di¤erent from 0 nor from the theoretically predicted
di¤erence (.01). Thus the theory is supported in four out of six paired comparisons.
The di¤erence is not statistically signicant at the 5% level in the two exceptions. See
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columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.
NA NB cmax bM   bP bM   bP bTM   bTP
4 5 :3 .075 (.055)+ .150 (.057)+ .117 (.048)+
3 6 :3 -.033 (.070)+ .055 (.072)+ .026 (.059)+
2 7 :3 -.110 (.080)+ -.061 (.075) -.072 (.065)+
4 5 :55 .117 (.035)+ .081 (.047)+ .097 (.031)+
3 6 :55 -.040 (.044) .094 (.047)+ 049 (.035)+
2 7 :55 -.185 (.052)+ -.036 (.047) -.069 (.039)
Table 3. H1, H2: Voting Rule Turnout E¤ects. +Correct sign.
*Signicant at 5% level or better.
H2 Total turnout is higher under M than under P.We nd support for this hypothesis
except for the extreme landslide elections (NA = 2) low cost elections, where turnout
rates are slightly higher in P than M. However, the NA = 2 low-cost elections are
the one exception where turnout is predicted to be higher in P than M. Thus the
theory is supported in ve out of six paired comparisons. Three of the ve di¤erences
are statistically signicant. The di¤erence is not statistically signicant in the one
exception. See the last column of Table 3.
H3 The competition e¤ect is reversed for the smaller party under P. That is, for
the smaller party, turnout decreases as their share of the electorate increases.
Under P for the majority party, as well as under M for both parties, the usual
competition e¤ect applies. The competition e¤ect on total turnout applies
to both P and M elections: i.e., more competitive elections lead to higher
turnout. We measure the competition e¤ect as the di¤erence in turnout between the
5-4 and 6-3 elections, the di¤erence in turnout between the 6-3 and 7-2 elections, and
the di¤erence between the 5-4 and 6-3 elections. The sign is correctly predicted in all
but three cases (33 out of 36 comparisons). In both exceptions, the di¤erences are not
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signicantly di¤erent from 0. See Table 4.
Comparison cmax M Pb5=4   b6=3 0:30 .109 (.037)+ .001 (.057)b6=3   b7=2 0:30 .023 (.085)+ -.053 (.064)+b5=4   b7=2 0:30 .132 (.086)+ -.052 (.046)+b5=4   b6=3 0:55 .043 (.028)+ -.114 (.041)+b6=3   b7=2 0:55 .106 (.051)+ -.038 (.045)+b5=4   b7=2 0:55 .149 (.051)+ -.152 (.036)+b5=4   b6=3 0:30 .116 (.033)+ .021 (.046)+b6=3   b7=2 0:30 .160 (.080)+ .044 (.066)+b5=4   b7=2 0:30 .276 (.077)+ .065 (.054)+b5=4   b6=3 0:55 .053 (.025)+ .065 (.029)+b6=3   b7=2 0:55 .114 (.047)+ -.015 (.047)b5=4   b7=2 0:55 .167 (.046)+ .050 (.048)+bT5=4   bT6=3 0:30 .112 (.028)+ .021 (.037)+bT6=3   bT7=2 0:30 .129 (.069)+ .031 (.055)+bT5=4   bT7=2 0:30 .241 (.067)+ .052 (.045)+bT5=4   bT6=3 0:55 .053 (.020)+ .004 (.026)+bT6=3   bT7=2 0:55 .117 (.037)+ -.001 (.037)bT5=4   bT7=2 0:55 .169 (.037)+ .003 (.034)+
Table 4. H3 Competition E¤ect
+Correct sign. *Signicant at 5% level or better.
H4 The competition e¤ect on total expected turnout is larger in the M elections
than the P elections. This is exactly what we nd in the data. The sign is correctly
predicted in all six cases, and the di¤erences are statistically di¤erent from 0 in four of
the six cases. See the last column of Table 5.
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Comparison cmax M P M   PbT5=4   bT6=3 0:30 .112 (.028) .021 (.037) .091 (.046)+bT6=3   bT7=2 0:30 .129 (.069) .031 (.055) .098 (.087)+bT5=4   bT7=2 0:30 .241 (.067) .052 (.045) .189 (.080)+bT5=4   bT6=3 0:55 .053 (.020) .004 (.026) .048 (.035)+bT6=3   bT7=2 0:55 .117 (.037) -.001 (.037) .118 (.052)+bT5=4   bT7=2 0:55 .169 (.037) .003 (.034) .166 (.050)+
Table 5. H4: Competition E¤ect M vs. P. .
+Correct sign. *Signicant at 5% level or better.
H5 In all P elections we study, there is an underdog e¤ect. There is an underdog
e¤ect in all M elections, except for the predicted reverse underdog e¤ects in
the low cost 5-4 and 6-3 M elections. All but one of our underdog hypotheses have
support in the data. We nd that in all P elections there is an underdog e¤ect, with one
exception where the di¤erence is less than one percentage point (b = :362, b = :370)
and not statistically signicant. That one exception is the 5-4 high cost treatment,
where theory predicts the smallest underdog e¤ect (less than four percentage points).
In the M elections, all predicted underdog and reverse underdog e¤ects are observed in
the data. (eleven of twelve comparisons).
Comparison cmax M Pb5=4   b5=4 0:30 -.013 (.051)+ .061 (.027)+b6=3   b6=3 0:30 -.007 (.058)+ .082 (.066)+b7=2   b7=2 0:30 .130 (.083)+ .179 (.057)+b5=4   b5=4 0:55 .028 (.035)+ -.007 (.047)b6=3   b6=3 0:55 .038 (.037)+ .172 (.052)+b7=2   b7=2 0:55 .046 (.057)+ .195 (.036)+
Table 6. H5: Underdog e¤ect. b  b
+Correct sign. *Signicant at 5% level or better.
Thus, the comparative statics are correctly predicted by theory in 66 out of 72 paired
comparisons. In none of the 6 exceptions are the di¤erences signicantly di¤erent from 0, and in
most cases not statistically di¤erent from the exact quantitative theoretical di¤erence. Overall,
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33 of the 66 correctly predicted signed di¤erences are signicantly di¤erent from 0 (at the 5%
level, using a two-tailed test and clustered standard errors). To illustrate in a single gure
how close the equilibrium turnout rates are to the equilibrium turnout rates, the gure below
presents a scatter plot of the observed vs. equilibrium turnout rates. A perfect t of the data
to the theory would have all the points lined up along the 45% degree line. A simple OLS
regression of the observed turnout on equilibrium turnout, using the 36 points in the graph
gives a slope of .815, an intercept of .097 and an R-squared equal to .871. The theoretical
model slightly underestimates turnout when the model prediction is below 50% and slightly
over-estimates turnout when the model prediction is over 50%, consistent with the ndings of
Levine and Palfrey (2007) on their much larger data set for plurality elections. Levine and
Palfrey (2007) show that the Logit QRE model can account fairly well for these over and
underpredictions of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Model. The same is true for our data. The
QRE estimation results are reported in Appendix B.
Figure 6: Scatter plot of observed vs. equilibrium turnout rates.
5. Concluding Remarks
For any distributions of partisan preferences and voting costs, we have shown that turnout
(of rational voters as well as of ethical voters and of mobilized voters) depends on the degree
39
of proportionality of inuence in the institutional system in a clear way: higher turnout in a
winner-take-all system than in a proportional power sharing system when the population is
evenly split in terms of partisan preferences, and vice versa when one partys position has a
clear majority of support.
In all of the di¤erent models we analyze and in all of the range of power sharing systems
we consider  2 [1;1); only partial (or zero) underdog compensation occurs, which guarantees
that the ex-ante favorite party obtains the higher vote share in a large election. Hence, in a
winner-take-all system it is quite clear that the underdog cannot win a large election, which
greatly discourages the contest, but with power sharing there is no absolute winner and some
competition remains.
The theoretical results are robust to a wide range of alternative assumptions about the vot-
ing game and about the rationality of the voters. The common feature of all the various models
considered in this paper is that with heterogeneity of voting costs full underdog compensation
is not possible, and hence the majority party is expected to maintain a considerable advantage
and winning margin in the election. The small probability of victory for the minority, i.e. the
low competitiveness of the electoral race, depresses signicantly the incentives to turn out in the
winner take all system except in the special case in which parties have equal support. Whereas
in a power sharing system the incentives to vote or to mobilize voters are a¤ected to a much
lesser extent by the competitiveness or the expected closeness of the electoral race.
Our prediction that for the larger party, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all system than
in a proportional power sharing system was conrmed by the experimental analysis, as well as
most of the other predictions concerning di¤erences in the competition and underdog e¤ects:
in particular, it is interesting that the competition e¤ect is reversed for the smaller party in
the proportional system. That is, for the smaller party, turnout decreases as their share of
the electorate increases. With a winner-take-all system, the usual competition e¤ect applies to
both parties: elections that are expected to be closer lead to higher turnout. The prediction
that competition e¤ect on total expected turnout is negligible in a proportional system also
found strong support.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma. 1 We rst show that
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0
Dene the modied Bessel functions of the rst kind, see Abramowitz and Stegun (1965), as
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For large z the modied Bessel functions are asymptotically equivalent and approximate
to, see Abramowitz and Stegun (1965)50
I0 (z) ' I1 (z) ' e
z
2z
For any exogenously xed (; ) 2 (0; 1]2 x and y go to innity as N goes to innity, so we can
approximate the benets of voting for large N as
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50X (z) ' Y (z) means that limz!1 X(z)Y (z) = 1:
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As a consequence for any given (; ) 2 (0; 1]2 the benets of voting vanish as N grows,
namely
lim
N!1
BAM(; ) = 0; lim
N!1
BBM(; ) = 0
Now consider (; ) as endogenous, i.e. solutions to the system
BAM(; ) = F
 1(); BBM(; ) = F
 1()
Since F and F 1 are increasing and continuous with F (0) = 0; then BAM(; ) = F
 1()
implies limN!1 N = 0: Likewise, we have limN!1 N = 0.
Next, we show that
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Suppose limN!1NN <1 and limN!1NN <1, then
lim
N!1
BAM(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N) > 0
and any solution to BAM(; ) = F
 1() would imply limN!1 N > 0, which contradicts
limN!1 N = 0:
Suppose limN!1NN =1 and limN!1NN <1, then limN!1 NN =1 which implies
(using a Taylor expansion of F 1 on the numerator and the denominator around zero) that
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=1:
For all N we have
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contradiction as L  1 cannot be equal to limN!1 F 1(N )F 1(N ) = 1. The same argument shows
that it cannot be the case that limN!1NN <1 and limN!1NN =1:
The above arguments also imply that we cannot have either
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N
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Proof of Lemma 2. For N large, since limN!1NN = limN!1NN = 1 we can use the
asymptotic expression for the modied Bessel functions, so the system becomes
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where o (x) groups terms of higher order than x; namely for which limN!1
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The above system yields
p
q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For ease of notation in what follows we omit the term o (1) and all similar o terms. But it
should be clear that where needed we can use the following property: 8" > 0; 9N : N > N
o (1) < ":
Since the function
p
F 1 () is increasing we can dene the function
 := M ()
where M : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is an increasing and di¤erentiable function with M (0) = 0. The
system is reduced to a single equation
BAM (; M ()) = F
 1 () ;
We now show existence of a solution to the above equation by showing that the two con-
tinuous functions on either side must cross at least once.
Assume wlog q < 1=2: We have
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q, so for all N above a certain value we have
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which proves existence of a solution, because F 1 () is increasing and F 1 (1) = 1:
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For uniqueness we need to show that the BAM is decreasing in , namely that the following
quantity is negative
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so it su¢ ces for F 1 () to be weakly convex, so it su¢ ces to have F () weakly concave.
As for the size e¤ect, note that the marginal benet side BAP decreases with N for all 
while the cost side remains unchanged. Hence by the implicit function theorem as we increase
N we have lower  which implies lower  and in turn lower turnout, formally
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The underdog compensation is a consequence of F 1 being increasing, namely
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Proof of Lemma 4. For given (; ) call the expected number of voters for each partyR := qN,
S := (1  q)N; we have
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and by symmetry
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Proof of Lemma 5. We rst show that
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0
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For any xed  > 0 and  > 0, by inspection of the closed form expression (2) we see that
limN!1BAP (; ) = limN!1B
B
P (; ) = 0, so the same argument obtained in Lemma (1) for
the M system applies.
Next, we show that
lim
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N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N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Summing the two P system equations we have
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Since the RHS goes to zero the LHS will too, which means that NT must go to innity
so we cannot have both limN!1NN < 1 and limN!1NN < 1. For N large, since the
exponential terms e NT in (2) vanish faster than the hyperbolic terms, the system approximates
to
(8)
(1  q) 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) ;
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Suppose limN!1NN =1 and limN!1NN <1, then limN!1 NN =1 which implies
(using a Taylor expansion of F 1 on the numerator and the denominator around zero) that
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=1: From (8) we have
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so we reach a contradiction as the above equality cannot hold as N !1: The same argument
shows that it cannot be the case that limN!1NN <1 and limN!1NN =1:
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
Proof of Lemma 6. The approximated system (8) yields
qF 1 () = (1  q) F 1 () + o (1)
q < 1=2 () 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For ease of notation in what follows we omit the term o (1) and all similar terms. But it
should be clear that where necessary we will use the following property: 8" > 0; 9N : N > N
o (1) < ":
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Since the function F 1 () is increasing we can dene
 := P ()
where P () : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is an increasing di¤erentiable function with P (0) = 0. We now
reduced the P system to one equation
BAP :=
(1  q) P ()
NT 2
= F 1 ()
which we now show has one and only one solution.
The cost side F 1 () is increasing from 0 to 1. Uniqueness comes from the fact that the
benet side decreases in  as its derivative is proportional to
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Hence a unique solution (P ; P (P )) exists for the equilibrium problem.
The proofs for the size e¤ect and the underdog compensation e¤ect are analogous to the
ones obtained in the M system. 
Proof of Proposition 7. First, we compare turnouts. Assuming the cost side F 1 () is the same
in the two systems, it su¢ ces to show that the benet sides of the equations determining the
equilibrium  are ranked.
For any q 6= 1=2 we need to show that eventually (i.e. for any N above a given N) we have
BAM (; M ()) < B
A
P (; P ()) ; for all  2 (0; 1]
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namely
e
 N
p
q 
p
(1 q)M
2p
N <
(1  q) P
(q+ (1  q) P )2
 p
q+
p
(1  q) M
4
p
 (q (1  q)M)1=4
1p
q
! 1
which is satised as LHS above converges to zero, whereas the RHS is a positive constant for
all  2 (0; 1] because
 2 (0; 1] =) P 2 (0; 1]; M 2 (0; 1]
q 6= 1=2 =) pq 6=
p
(1  q) M ()
Hence, for any eventually we have
q 6= 1=2 =) M < P
The symmetry property  (q) =  (1  q) (which holds in both the M and P systems) implies
q 6= 1=2 =) M < P
hence
q 6= 1=2 =) TM < TP
For q = 1=2 we have  =  in both P and M systems. We need to show that eventually
BAM > B
A
P ;  2 (0; 1]
namely
1p
N

2
p
q
4
p


1
q
>
1
N

q
2 (2q)2

Rearranging we have
p
N

1
2
p

p
q

>

1
8q

which is satised as the RHS is a positive constant and the LHS increases to innity. Hence
q = 1=2 =) M > P =) TM > TP
Next, we compare underdog compensation e¤ects. Given that for the M system we have
qM
 
F 1 (M)
2
= (1  q) M
 
F 1 (M)
2
and for the P system we have
qP
 
F 1 (P )

= (1  q) P
 
F 1 (P )

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then
1  q
q
=

P
P
2 F 1(P )
P
F 1(P )
P
!
=

M
M
3 F 1(M )
M
F 1(M )
M
!2
By denition of derivative at zero we have
dF 1
dx
jx=0 = lim
x!0
F 1 (x)
x
2 (0;1)
For N large,  and  converge to zero both in the M and in the P system so
lim
N!1
 
F 1()

F 1()

!
= 1
and the result follows. If dF
 1
dx
jx=0 2 f0;1g then the above limit is indeterminate and the result
need not be true. If the function F 1 is innitely di¤erentiable and n is the lowest integer for
which
dnF 1
dxn
jx=0 2 (0;1)
then by iterating the procedure we have
lim
N!1
 
dn 1F 1()
dn 1
dn 1F 1()
dn 1
!
= 1
so the underdog compensation comparison generalizes to
1  q
q
=

P
P
n+1
=

M
M
2n+1

Proof of Lemma 8. Express the following series by di¤erentiating and integrating the sum-
mands and inverting the series and integral operators
1X
b=0
Bb
b!
a
a+ b+ c
=
a
Ba+c
1X
b=0
Z B
0
d
dr

1
b!
ra+b+c
a+ b+ c

dr
=
a
Ba+c
Z B
0
1X
b=0

1
b!
ra+b+c 1

dr =
8>>><>>>:
a
Ba+c
R B
0
ra+c 1erdr for a  1
1=3 for a = c = 0
and likewise
1X
b=0
Bb
b!
a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
=
a+ 1
Ba+c+1
Z B
0
ra+cerdr
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We compute the marginal benet for party A by inverting the series and integral operators
again over the series over a.
BAP = e
 (A+B+C)
0@ 1X
c=0
Cc
c!
0@ P1a=0 Aaa!  a+1Ba+c+1 R B0 ra+cerdr
 P1a=1 Aaa!  aBa+c R B0 ra+c 1erdr
1A  1
3
1A
= e (A+B+C)
0@ 1X
c=0
Cc
c!
0@ R B0 rcBc+1  (Ar=B) e(Ar=B) + e(Ar=B) erdr
  R B
0
rc 1
Bc
 
(Ar=B) e(Ar=B)

erdr
1A  1
3
1A
Inverting the series and integral operators again over the series over c.
BAP = e
 (A+B+C)
0@ R B0  (Ar=B) e(Ar=B) + e(Ar=B)  P1c=0 Ccc! rcBc+1  erdr
  R B
0
 
(Ar=B) e(Ar=B)
 P1
c=0
Cc
c!
rc 1
Bc

erdr   1
3
1A
= e (A+B+C)
Z B
0

A
B
re
A+B+C
B
r + e
A+B+C
B
r

1
B
  A
B
e
A+B+C
B
r

dr   1
3

Computing the integral and simplifying, we have
BAP = e
 (A+B+C)
0@0@ AB  1 eA+B+C(A+B+C)2 + eA+B+CA+B+C + B eA+B+C 1A+B+C  1B
 A
B

B e
A+B+C 1
A+B+C

1A  1
3
1A
=

1  A
A+B + C

1  e (A+B+C)
A+B + C
+

A
A+B+C
  1
3

e (A+B+C)

Proof of Proposition 9. A similar calculation gives the analogous result for r parties:
BAP (r) =
0@  1  AA+B+C+:::+r 1 e (A+B+C+:::+r)A+B+C+:::+r
+
 
A
A+B+C+:::+r   1r

e (A+B+C+:::+r)
1A
For large enough N; BAP approximates to
BAP '

1  A
A+B + C + :::+ r

1
A+B + C + :::+ r
=

qB + qC + ::
(qA + qB + qC + ::)
2

1
N
so the benet still decreases as N 1, which implies a higher turnout than in M except in the
case when the two parties in M have the same ex-ante support: q = 1=2.
For r parties with equal ex-ante support we have
qA = qB = qC = ::: = qr = 1=r =)  =  =  = :::
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the rst order condition for a party becomes
1  1
r

1  e rN
rN


1  1
r

1
rN
= F 1 (r)
so the turnout for that party r increases in r: Overall turnout increases too as in this symmetric
case we have.
Tr = r

6. Appendix B: Results from QRE estimation. Online Supplementary
Material. Not for Publication.
Table 7 displays the estimated logit QRE turnout rates, constraining the logit parameter
to be the same across all treatments within each voting rule. The estimated value of b is 7 for
the the M data and 17 for the P data. There is essentially no change in the estimated QRE
turnout rates if b is constrained to be equal in both treatments.
NA NB cmax Rule b b bT b b T b
4 5 .3 M 0.622* (.047) 0.636* (.050) 0.630* (.042) 0.61 0.65 0.63
3 6 .3 M 0.513* (.046) 0.520* (.055) 0.518* (.044) 0.51 0.52 0.52
2 7 .3 M 0.490* (.073) 0.360* (.060) 0.389* (.054) 0.44 0.42 0.42
4 5 .55 M 0.479* (.026) 0.451* (.028) 0.464* (.021) 0.48 0.45 0.46
3 6 .55 M 0.436* (.025) 0.399* (.030) 0.411* (.022) 0.44 0.40 0.41
2 7 .55 M 0.330* (.045) 0.284* (.037) 0.294* (.031) 0.33 0.28 0.29
4 5 .3 P 0.547 (.029) 0.486 (.028) 0.513 (.026) 0.48 0.44 0.46
3 6 .3 P 0.547* (.054) 0.465* (.048) 0.492* (.040) 0.55 0.40 0.45
2 7 .3 P 0.600 (.036) 0.421* (.047) 0.461* (.038) 0.65 0.37 0.43
4 5 .55 P 0.362* (.024) 0.370* (.039) 0.367* (.024) 0.35 0.32 0.33
3 6 .55 P 0.477 (.037) 0.305* (.037) 0.362* (.028) 0.40 0.29 0.33
2 7 .55 P 0.515* (.027) 0.320 (.029) 0.363 (.024) 0.48 0.27 0.32
Table 7. Observed turnout rates. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
The scatter plot of the QRE turnout rates against the observed turnout rates is given below.
Note that the slope has increased from 0.82 to 0.89, the constant term has decreased from 0.10
to 0.07 and the R2 has increased from .87 to .91.
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Figure 7: Turnout Rates
55
7. Appendix C: Online Supplementary Material. Not for Publication.
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision making experiment. During
the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you follow
instructions carefully. You may not open other applications on your computer, chat with
other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading
books, etc. You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Di¤erent participants may earn di¤erent amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. The entire experiment will
take place through computer terminals, and all interaction between you will take place through
the computers. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with
other participants during the experiments. During the instruction period, you will be given a
complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you
have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be
answered out loud so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has
begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
We will begin with a brief practice session to help familiarize you with the computer
interface. The practice rounds will be followed by 2 di¤erent paid sessions. Each paid session
will consist of 50 rounds. At the end of the last paid session, you will be paid the sum of what
you have earned in all rounds of the two paid sessions, plus the show-up fee of $5.00. Everyone
will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in POINTS. Your DOLLAR earnings are
determined by multiplying your earnings in POINTS by a conversion rate. In this experiment,
the conversion rate is 0.002, meaning that 100 POINTS is worth 20 cents.
We will now go through two practice rounds to explain the rules for the rst part of the
experiment, and will explain the screen display. During the practice rounds, please do not hit
any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the computer to enter information,
please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. You are not paid for these practice rounds.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please pull out your dividers. Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says
MULTISTAGE CLIENT. When the computer prompts you for your name, type your First and
Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait for further instructions.
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SCREEN 1 (user interface)
[Point out while reading the following.]
You now see the rst screen of the experiment on your computer. It should look similar
to this screen. Please do not do anything with your mouse yet, until I have nished explaining
the screen. [POINT TO PPT SLIDE DISPLAYED ON SCREEN IN FRONT OF ROOM]
Here are the instructions for the rst part of the experiment. At the top of the screen will
be your id number. Each of you has been assigned to one of two groups, called the ALPHA
GROUP and the BETA GROUP. The ALPHA group always has 2 members and the BETA
group always has 7 members. The screen informs you which group you will be in and reminds
you how many members are in each group.
Each of you will be asked to choose either Xor Yby clicking on a button with the
mouse. Please wait and dont do anything yet.
The sample display in front of the room shows you what the screen looks like for a member
of the Alpha group. The screen also tells you what your Y bonusis. This is an extra bonus
you earn if you choose Y instead of X, independent of what other participants choose.
Your earnings are computed in the following way. It is very important that you understand
this, so please listen carefully.
SCREEN 2
[Point while reading.] First suppose you choose X. To compute your earnings, we compare
the number of members of your group choosing Xto the number of members of the other
group choosing X. Your payo¤ is 105 if the number of members in your group choosing X is
greater than the number of members of the other group who choose X. Your payo¤ is 55 if the
number of members in your group choosing X is equal to the number of members of the other
group who choose X. Your payo¤ is 5 if the number of members in your group choosing X is
fewer than the number of members of the other group who choose X.
Your earnings are computed slightly di¤erently if you choose Y. Specically, in addition to
the above earnings (either 105, 55, or 5) you also earn your Y bonus. This payo¤ information
is displayed in a table on your screen.
The amount of each participants Y-bonus is assigned completely randomly by the computer
at the beginning of each round and is shown in the second line down from the top of the screen.
Y-bonuses are assigned separately for each participant, so di¤erent participants will typically
have di¤erent Y-bonuses. What you see up the front is just an example of one participants
Y-bonus. In any given round you will have an equal chance of being assigned any Y-bonus
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between 0 and 30 points. Your Y-bonus in each round will not depend on your Y-bonus or
decisions in previous rounds, or on the Y-bonuses and decisions of other participants. While
you will be told your own Y-bonus in each round before making a decision, you will never be
told the Y-bonuses of other participants. You will only know that each of the other participants
has a Y-bonus that is some number between 0 and 30.
At this time, if your ID number is even, please click on row label Y; if your ID number is
odd, please click on the row label X. Once everyone has made their selection, the results from
this rst practice round are displayed on your screen. It will look like
SCREEN 3
if your choice was X, and
SCREEN 4
if your choice was Y.
This completes the rst practice round, and you now see a screen like this. The bottom
of the screen contains a history panel. This panel will be updated to reect the history of all
previous rounds. [go over columns of history screen]
At the beginning of every new round you will be randomly re-assigned to new groups,
and will have the opportunity to choose between Xand Y. In other words, you will not
necessarily be in the same group during each round. You will also be randomly reassigned a
new Y-bonus at the beginning of each round.
We will now go to a second practice round. When this practice round is over, an online
quiz will appear on your screen. Everyone must answer all the questions correctly before we
can proceed to the paid rounds. Does anyone have any question?
Please take note of your new group assignment, alpha or beta, since the group assignments
are shu­ ed randomly between each round. Also, please take note of your new Y-bonus, which
has been randomly redrawn between the values of 0 and 30.
[SLIDE 4 ]
GO TO NEXT MATCH
Please make your decision now by clicking on the row label X or Y.
A quiz is now displayed on your screen. Please read each question carefully and select
the correct answer. Once everyone has answered all the questions correctly, you may all go
on to the second page of the quiz. After everyone has correctly answered the second page of
questions, we will begin the rst paid session. If you have any questions as you are completing
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the quiz, please feel free to raise your hand and I will go to your workstation to answer your
question.
The rst paid session will follow the same instructions as the practice session. There will
be a total of 50 rounds in the rst paid session. Let me summarize those instructions before
we start.
[Go over summary slide.] Are there any questions before we begin the rst paid session?
[Answer questions.] Please begin. There will be 50 rounds, and then you will receive new
instructions. (Play rounds 1 50) The rst session is now over.
SESSION 2
We will now begin session 2.
[SLIDE 5]
The second paid session will be slightly di¤erent from the rst session. Let me summarize
those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. The rules are the same as before with only
one exception. In each round of this session, you will have an equal chance of being assigned a
Y-bonus between 0 and 55 points. Again, our Y-bonus in each round will not depend on your Y-
bonus or decisions in previous rounds, or on the Y-bonuses and decisions of other participants.
While you will be told your own Y-bonus in each round before making a decision, you will
never be told the Y-bonuses of the other participants. You will only know that each of the
other participants has a Y-bonus that is some number between 0 and 55. You may choose X
or Y.
There will be 50 rounds in this second session. After each round, group assignments will be
randomly reshu­ ed and everyone will be reassigned a new Y-bonus. Therefore, some rounds
you will be in the Alpha group and other rounds you will be in the Beta group. In either case,
everyone is told which group they are in and what their private Y-bonus is, before making a
choice of X or Y.
Are there any questions before we begin the second paid session? (no quiz) Please Begin.
(Play rounds 1 50)
Session 2 is now over. Please record your total earnings in dollars for the experiment on
your record sheet. After you have recorded your earnings, click the okbutton. We cannot pay
anyone until everyone has recorded their earnings AND clicked the ok button. Please remain
seated and you will be called up one by one according to your ID number to have your recorded
earnings amount checked against our own record. Please wait patiently and do not talk or use
the computers.
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